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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
THE FACTOR OF TIME IN SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
The element of time is present in every contract either by
express stipulation of the parties or by implication of law. Will
it be held of the very essence so that failure to perform on the
day will be fatal to any rights under contract, or merely material
so that performance within a reasonable time only will be re-
quired? Or will it be cast aside as immaterial and the contract
be enforced regardless of the passage of time? Of what influence
is the time factor in equity? This note will be confined to a treat-
ment of the problem as applied to specific performance in the light
of the West Virginia cases.
When Time is not Essential. Contrary to the usual position
of the common law, time is not ordinarily considered essential
either in West Virginia' or elsewhere in equity cases. Failure to
perform on the very day will not in the ordinary case bar relief
regardless of the nature of the action the performance of which
is delayed whether it be the payment of the purchase price,2 de-
livery of a deed, 3 or the performance of other acts.4  This is true
when the contract is entirely executory on both sides, and nothing
has been done in reliance upon it. In equity an executory con-
tract is treated as an executed transaction vesting the equitable
title in the vendee ab initio. Consequently, equity will in a proper
case refuse to enforce strictly a stipulation as to time so as to for-
feit a vested equitable interest. A fortiori, time will not be con-
sidered essential when the contract has been executed in whole or
part on one side, or the plaintiff has changed his position in re-
liance on the contract.5 Clearly here the element of hardship
1 Ballard v. Ballard, 25 W. Va. 470 (1885); Vaught v. Cain, 31 W. Va.
424, 7 S. E. 9 (1888); Tarvis v. Cowger's Heirs. 41 W. Va. 268, 23 S. E.
522 (1895); Bowden v. Laing, 103 W. Va. 733, 138 S. E. 449 (1927).
2 Ballard v. Ballard. sipra n. 1.
3 Rader v. Neal, 13 W. Va. 373 (1878); Core v. 'Wigner, 32 W. Va. 277, 9
S. E. 36 (1889); Vaught v. Cain. sunra n. 1; Armstrong v. Maryland Coal
Co., 67 W. Va. 589. 69 S. E. 195 (1910); Broemsen v. Agnie, 70 W. Va. 106,
73 S. E. 253 (1911) ; Rollvson v. Bourn. 85 W. Va. 15, 100 S. E. 682 (1919).
4 Castle v. Gibson, 77 W. Va. 116, 87 S. E. 174 (1915); W. Va. 0. & 0. Co.,
v. Vinal, 14 W. Va. 637 (1879).
G Abbott v. L'Hommedieu, 10 W. Va. 677 (1877) (Plaintiff in possession
and paying taxes); Ballard v. Ballard, supra n. 1 (Plaintiff in possession);
Jarvis v. Cowgers' Heirs. sitmra n. 1 (Part pa3ment of purchase price);
Castle v. Libson, supra n. 4 (Plaintiff dismissed suits against defendant).
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comes into the picture making a strict adheizence to the letter of
tli contract : inequitable.
It must he .noted, however, that although time will not
prdinarily be essential, it may be and generally is material, in
the sense that delay will under .certain circumstances interpose ja
bar.-, Where -possession. is, not taken under, the contract, time will
always be , material,. the burden being -placed on the defaulting
part to sho .,excuse for, his delay, particularly. where specific
.exec,utipn would involve hardship, to the, opposite, party. The
taking of possession is .an, impoitant step towards performance,
lxich.rebuts any presumption of abandonment.,
A plaintiff must show himself to have been, .',rqady, desirous,
prompt, and willing" to perform on his part to invoke the power
of the court. This maxim will be invoked against one whose de-
lay is for speculative purposes, or where valuable evidence has
been-lost because of the 'delay,8 or Where "there has 'been a sub-
stantial change in the circiistances and parties,6 or wherd the
ilit&ists of third pafies'have intervened.' ' Delay 'will Taisd'an
inffe6renee of abandonment-orhn admission of no just right.' It
is:frequently said that a' 'change' in the 'value of the sidbject Tdatter
will- iot'in-itsclf be sufficent t6 bar specific 'performance. This
is on the theory that the parties assume the risk of fluctuations.
In'fadt,'however, The West Virginia'cases shoW. 'that change in
value, 'particularly if gret, will influeiic the gour ini'-flnding
laehes,"'and for 'ihat iasoii ±eftise its aid-:
"Where no parti'ular-'hardship is shoft' however, aid''there
i"n0 evidence of bad'-faith on the 'part of thd plhintiff, any facts
and circuffmstances which show an excuse f0r ddla' ivill -be sufficieit
tb ieb it the inf66nde as'to abandonment.14 -' As to just what will
cohstiftt an excuse fin this situation does ndt admit of exact'defini-
6 Harrison v. Harrison, 36 W. Va. 556, 15 S. E. 87 (1892); Lowther Oil Co.
v. Miller-Siblev ,Oil Co.,, 53- W. Va. 501, 44 S. E. 433 (1903) Buffalo Coal &
Coke Co. v. ,anCe, 7-- I Va. 148, 76 S. E. 177 (1912)'; Wilkinson'v. Poling,
74 W. Va.' 399, '82 S. E. 47 (1914). ,' 64 .1 ' Va
7 Wilkinson 'v. Poling, supra n. 6; Crawford v. Workman, . Va, 0,61 S. B. .319- (1908) .,.
' -Snyder v '.Charieston & Southside Bridge Co. 65 W. Vra. 1, 63 S., B. 616
'9 Wellmah 'V. Virginian Ry' Co., 85 *. Va. 169, 101' d. E.' 25 (1919);
Dyer -7. fluffy, 139-,W. Va. 148, 19 S& E. 540 (19)
10 Snyder' v. Charleston & Soiithside Brdge Co., spra n. 8.
11 Harrison v. Harrison,-.supra n. 6; Wollna v. Virginia-4 Ry. Co., sia n.
91 Bluestone Coal Co. , y. Bell, 38 W. Va. ,297, 1S 5., E. 493 (1893),;' unt
v.? Mabie,-'72 W. V t. 202, 77 S. B. 987 (1913).
12 Abbott '. 'L'Hoiniedieu suprd n. 5.
13Btiffido C. & 0 'Co. v.'Vailce, mtpra n. 6.
14 Blake v. Blake, 98 W. Va. 346, 128 S. E. 139 (1925).
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tion. A mistake or ignorance of the law as well as of fact has
been held sufficient, 5 and there is language to the effect that any
excuse which lays hold on the conscience of the chancellor will
meet the requirement.'
Where the delay is on the part of the vendor in perfecting
title, specific performance will ordinarily be granted, provided
the delay has not otherwise interposed a bar, if the vendor is able
to convey a good title at the time of the decree." Obviously, this
will. be true when at the time of the contract the vendee knew of
the defect and knew that it would take some time to remove the
flaw."'8 This rule contrasts, however, with the situation at law,
where tender of performance prior to bringing suit is ordinarily
a prerequisite to recovery. There appears to be in the ordinary
case, little hardship on the vendee involved in this equity rule. If
time is not essential, and the vendor is not chargeable with laches in
tendering performance or bringing suit, it would seem to be of
small concern whether during this period he had the power to
tender a valid title. At the time of suit if the vendor knowingly
conceals the defect, however, he will not be granted specific per-
formance even if, after suit is brought, the defects are cured, if
the vendee objects before the decree. 9 This is, of course, because
the transaction thus tainted with fraud may be rescinded by the
vendee. By the English rule, the vendee may rescind upon learn-
ing of the defect in title. There is no indication that this rule
would be followed in West Virginia.
Time is given least weight in cases where the vendee goes into
possession under the contract and retains it with constant asser-
tion of his right,20 especially so if he has not only gone into
possession but also paid the purchase price in whole or in part, or
made valuable improvements, or both. 2' In this situation a delay
for a longer period than that of the Statute of Limitations will
15 Applegate v. Wellsburg Banking & Trust Co., 68 W. Va. 477, 69 S. E.
901 (1910).
16 Blake v. Blake, supra n. 14.
17 See cases cited supra n. 6.
"' Rader v. Neal, supra n. 3.
19 Spencer v. Sandusky, 46 W. Va. 582, 33 S. E. 221 (1899).
20 Mills v. McLanahan, 70 W. Va. 288, 73 S. E. 927 (1912); Bartlett v.
Johnson, 89 W. Va. 45, 108 S. E. 431 (1921).
21 Nuttall v. McVey, 63 W. Va. 380, 60 S. E. 251 (1908); Norman v. Ben-
nett, 32 W. Va. 614, 9 S. E. 914 (1889).
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not bar the action.22 There is apparently no disposition to apply
the statute by analogy here.
Wien Time is Essential. Although time is not ordinarily es-
sential it may be so by reason of the nature of the subject matter
or the object of the sale, or it may be made essential by express
stipulation either at the inception or after default of one party.
It is well settled law elsewhere that time may be of the essence
because of the nature of the subject matter, as where it is perish-
able or of fluctuating value.22 Apparently, a mere change in the
value of land does not bring it within this rule, although it may be
one of the circumstances to be considered on the question of the
effect of delay.24  Mining properties so fluctuate in value as to
come within the rule.25 No case in West Virginia holds time es-
sential for this reason, although the principle is cited with favor
in dicta by our court. 6
It is recognized in West Virginia as elsewhere that time may
be of the essence because of the purpose or object of the contract.
In Clay v. Deskins, 7 A, while suit for sale of his land was pend-
ing, contracted to sell to B, $250 to be paid in hand, the remainder
within ten months. After the date for payment and B not having
tendered performance, the land was sold at public auction. B
sued for specific performance. The court denied relief on the
theory that time was of the essence because of the implied inten-
tion of the parties that payment should be made before the public
sale. The decision is clearly sound.
West Virginia recognizes that time may be made of the es-
sence by express stipulation.2  This a recognition of the doctrine
that the intention of the parties should govern, when clearly and
unequivocally expressed.29
In Gas Co. v. Elder,0 the contract contained the following:
"It is expressly understood and agreed that if the first payment is
22 In Nuttall v. MeVev, s ,ra m. 21, the delay was for 47 years. and in Nor-
man v. Bennett, =nra n. 21, for 28 years, yet the court showed no inclina-
tion to arplv the ststut by anilogv.
23 PoAERoy. SPrc.Fpc PFmFOR,.rANO] (3d ed. 1926) 813.
24 Abbott v. L'Iommedieu, .uvra n. 5.
25 POlnROY, Om ct. supra n. 23. at 818, n. 4 (b).
28 Ballard v. Ballard. sunra n. 1.
27 ClaV v. Deskins. .36 W. Va. 50. 15 S. B. 85 (1892).
2F Thompson v. Robinson, 65 W. Va. 506, 64 S. E. 718 (1908).
25 Thompson v. Robinson. sura n. 28, at 507.
30 54 W. Va. 335, 46 S. E. 257 (1903).
150.
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not made on the 30th .... , or as soon thereafter as the title shall
be examined and accepted by the party of the second part .... ,
this agreement shall be considered as rescinded and neither party
shall be bound thereby."''3 It was held that these words did make
time essential, but that due to the wording, the condition as to
time was subsequent and not precedent, and therefore, worked a
forfeiture which could be relieved against and this though the ven-
dee had done nothing under the contract and thus would suffer no
great hardship from a denial of specific performance.
The court in distinguishing the language of this case from
similar wording in the case last cited, deeming one to create a
condition precedent and the other a condition subsequent was sim-
ply juggling words; the intention in each case was obviously the
same.
Of course, the mere fixing of a time for performance does
not, in itself, make time essential. And this is true even if the
contract expressly states - "It is .... agreed that papers and
consideration are to be executed and passed within thirty days."
This statement does not clearly evidence an intention to make time
of the essence.12
The case of Cosby v. Honakers3 recognizes the firmly settled
doctrine that either party may after the time set for completing
the contract make time of the essence by notice to the other party.
Apparently West Virginia would follow the orthodox view that
the notice cannot arbitrarily terminate the contract, but must stip-
ulate a reasonable time. Under our decisions, the intention to
make time essential must be stated in clear and unequivocal
language, and the mere notice that the opposite party must per-
form by a specified date is insufficient.34 This power is not ob-
jectionable. It may be exercised only after the other party would
be in default at law, and has practical value in preventing unwar-
ranted delay and in substituting a definite time for the indefinite
one of a reasonable time for performance. If time was not original-
ly of the essence, it may be made so by express agreement or by
subsequent conduct which makes it clear that such was the inten-
tion of the parties.3 5
Where the performance of certain conditions precedent before
31 INd., at 336. In addition to the point discussed in this paragraph the
court also relied on several other grounds for reversal.32 Bowden v. Laing, stpra n. 1, at 735.
33 57 W. Va. 513, 50 S. E. 610 (1905).
341bid.
35 Uenry v. Dudley, 91 W. Va, 696, 114 S, B, 286 (1922).
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or by a fixed- date are required before any rights vest under the
contract, such performance, on time, will, be held essential. In
Fraznev. Frame,8 involving suit by a son against a father for
specific , performance, of ra parol ,gift, of , land; ,there; was some, evi-
,dence that.,the gift was conditional on the making of certain im-
provements, -.which were not: shown to have been made on time.
Specific performance was denied., The case 'seems, unobjectionable,
on itg>own facts, .or as applied ,tothe ordinary, contract situation.
Before the performance of thecondition precedent, ,no rights, legal
or equitable, ,vest, in the party, subject to thecQonditions..
Will equity relax the time requirement in an option?, The two
earlier cases-,of ox v, ,ox, , ,and Weaver v.,Burr,31, apparently
take theposition that, in the optioi situation, acoeptance within the
period limited is necessarily essential. In the case of Barrett v.
MfcAlister,'? however, the court, overrulingi.Weaver v. Burr, de-
cided&- that, there may- be an excuse for non-payment within, the
time specified although payment is' to be the act of, acceptance.
Therex the vendor ;would not have: been able to make! good title at
the stipulated 'time, and thisfdct -was held sufficient to excuse ten-
der of payment by the optionee on the ground that aperson will
not in equity, be 'required to do a' useless thing It is' difficult to
se how- it, can be said that, an act of acceptance; i&s ever auseless
thing so far as the creation of the contract -,is concerned., , 'Polloak
v. 'Brookover,1' ,:a more recdnt case;. involved,'similar facts minUs
the,inability;of the offerorto perform on time., In that case it was
said, ",When. payment, was the act 'of acceptance',. . ., then . , .
the-ae tof assent, orpayments,must 'be done within the prescribed
time, andtime'is from, the veryinature:of, the contractessential,.' A
Thus; the rule in West Virginiawould ,seem to be that in the
6ption situation, time is ordinarily essential, buti a short delaymay
be excused if-it can be -showh that the 6fferor, hifnself was unable
to perform "on'the specified , day. Ori prineiple it would seemy that
the Iquestion in this type of'ease isg not whether' de]ay in perform-
aneis ,excusable, but'the more fiindamental' one of'whether ,a con -
tract, has even been c reated. It iselementar.r that to, oroatd' a con-
tract an offer must be accepted according to its 'terms. That thd
".132 W. Va. i63, 9 S. E. 901 (1889).
-31 W."Va. V36. 8 8. E. 7 (18).
39 33 W. Va. 738, 11 '. E. "220 (1q9O).
40 6o W. VP. 75, 53 S. R. 795 (19Q ),
4 Ibid., at 83.
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offeror cannot himself perform promptly does not warrant a court
in making a new offer for him-
It is important to note in the option cases the distinction be-
tween the situation where payment of the purchase price is the
act of acceptance, and where it is merely the act of performance.
the offer being otherwise accepted. If it is the latter, then whether
or not time is essential will depend on the interpretation of the
contract.
42
West Virginia apparently places an important limitation on
the doctrine that time may be made of the essence. It is this, -
though time is made of the essence, when the covenants are mutual-
ly dependent one party cannot set up the default of the opposite
party if it is shown that he was not ready and able to perform on
his own part, or even that he failed to offer to perform. 43  The rule
seems to be that in order to take advantage of the stipulation that
time is of the essence, the party must show a tender on his part
if the covenants are mutually dependent, or at least that he was
ready, able and willing to perform on the specified day. Of
course, if under the contract the performance on one side was to
precede that on the other, although both were to be performed on
the same day, it would not be necessary for the latter to make a
tender but only to be ready, able and willing to perform. This
rule would only apply where acts are to be performed simultan-
eously. The point is not without difficulty. If the provision mak-
ing time of performance of certain acts essential is for the benefit
of a given party, it is arguable that he should be permitted to in-
sist upon a strict compliance by the other regardless of his own
position. On the other hand, this is a situation where to require
a tender of performance by one party in compliance with the stip-
ulations as to time would be to require a useless thing since the
other party is unable to perform on the day.
Where time is made essential the ordinary rule is that the
party in whose favor the stipulation exists may waive his privilege
to declare the contract at an end. 44 The waiver may, of course, be
express as by the granting of further time, or it may be implied
from the subsequent acceptance of payments under written mod-
ifications of the contract which do not expressly stipulate for es-
sentiality of time, or from any conduct which is consistent only
with a recognition that the contract is still in force. This seems
42 Watson v. Comst, 35 W. Va. 463, 14 S. E. 249 (1891).
43 Gas Co. v. Elder, snpro, n. 30.
44 POMEROY, op. cit. supra n. 23, at 838 et seq.
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to be the effect of two of the West Virginia cases.4 The case
of Thompson v. Robinson,4" however, casts doubt upon and strictly
limits the entire doctrine. Recognizing that under our decisions
there may perhaps be oral waiver, the court declares that on prin-
ciple the situation is within the Statute of Frauds and that oral
waiver is valid only when it occurs before the expiration of the
time set for performance. Thus, it was stated, acts recognizing
the contract as existing after the date of performance such as hav-
ing an abstract made and delivered to the vendee, did not operate
as a waiver. This practically excludes all possibility of waiver by
conduct. The court's view is based on the concept that the stip-
ulation making time of the essence operates automatically to term-
inate the contract, while the whole doctrine of waiver is based on
the idea that such stipulation gives one or both parties the priv-
ilege of termination, the benefit of which may be waived.
-Guy OTTO FARAEu.
45, Power Co. v. Voight, 91 W. Va. 581, 114 S. E. 188 (1922).
46 Supra n. 29.
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